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adverse or insufficient judgment in the trial court.19 An attorney cannot be required
to take an appeal unless it is provided for in his contract.
2 0
In reading the cases one is inclined to conclude that the courts are at times
straining to find divisibility in order to achieve a just result. But to find divisi-
bility solely for that purpose is stretching the concept to areas neither con-
templated nor covered by contract. The law does not recognize the equities of
the parties in determining whether a contract is entire or divisible. It is purely
a matter of construction.21 Also, reasonable value as a basis for the award in the
Moore case is completely inconsistent with recovery under a divisible contract
for fully performed parts thereof.
22
If a recovery for Moore is to be justified at all, it should rest frankly upon
the principle of Britton v. Turner.2 3 This would align California with the juris-
dictions supporting the minority position that it is inequitable to allow a party
to retain benefits beyond the extent of his assessable damages without obligation
and thus to be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.24
James R. Slaybaugk
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE JURISDICTION OvER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
In part, I believe, the conflict at the bar is a product of the circumstance that the rule
is in process of redefinition and has apparently not yet crystallized in its new form. 1
When Federal District Judge Rifkind said this in 1945, he was referring
to the absence of any concrete rule for determining the amenability of a foreign
corporation to suits in state courts.
In December, 1957, when the case of McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co.2 was decided by the United States Supreme Court, a new step toward this
crystallization of a rule was taken. In this case, Lulu B. McGee recovered a
default judgment against the insurance company in a California court. The
company, a Texas corporation, had no agents or offices in California and had
never done business here apart from the isolated transactions relating to the
policy sued on. The policy had been mailed to the insured, McGee's son in
California. Premiums were mailed from California where the insured was a
resident until his death. The California courts based jurisdiction on service of
19 See Pinto v. Seely, 22 Cal. App. 318, 135 Pac. 43 (1913).
20 WOOD, FEE CONTRACTS OF LAWYERS § 51 (1936).
21 Pacific Wharf & Storage Co. v. Standard Am. Dredging Co., 184 Cal. 21, 192 Pac. 847
(1920).
22 The plaintiff in the Moore case also relied on Salopek v. Shoemann, 20 Cal. App. 2d
150, 124 P.2d 21 1942, as authority for the point that an attorney discharged for cause may
recover the reasonable value of services actually rendered up to the time of his discharge.
The Salopek case can be distinguished on the facts. In that case the court found that the
attorney had been discharged for cause, but they found no evidence that he had committed
any breach of his contract.
2 See Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1953), following Britton v. Turner and in which the authorities are collected and discussed.
24 See 5 CoRBsN, CONTRAcTS § 1127, at 568-70 (1950). But see 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1477, at 4130 (rev. ed. 1938).
1 Snyder v. White Eng'r. Corp., 60 F. Supp. 789, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
2 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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process on the Insurance Commissioner, as authorized by the Insurance Code,
which provides:3
Any of the acts described in Section 1611 [issuance or delivery of contracts of insur-
ance, solicitation of applications, collection of premiums, or any other transactions
arising out of such contracts], when effected in this State, by mail or otherwise, by a
foreign or alien insurer . . . shall constitute an appointment by such insurer of the
commissioner... to be its true and lawful attorney, upon whom may be served all
lawful process in any action, suit or proceeding ... arising out of any such contracts
of insurance ....
The company was served by registered mail at its principal place of business
in Texas, as required by the Insurance Code.4 Unable to collect the judgment
in California, Mrs. McGee brought an action in Texas to enforce it. The Texas
court refused enforcement, holding that service of process outside California
was ineffective to acquire jurisdiction. 5
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Texas court, deciding that
assumption of jurisdiction by the California court was not a denial of due process,
saying:5
It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which
had a substantial connection with the state.
In the McGee decision, the United States Supreme Court relied on the "fair
play" rule first presented in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.7 Prior to this
case, jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was determined by mechanical rules
that required a fixed quantity of activity in the state for the corporation to be
subject to suit there. The International Shoe case substituted a consideration of
the quality and nature of the corporation's activity as the test for jurisdiction.
To be amenable to suit, due process required only that the foreign corporation
have:8
... certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
State courts are not required to expand their jurisdiction co-extensive with
a federal holding like International Shoe which redefines and liberalizes the due
process requirement. An examination of the California cases, however, shows
the intention of the courts here is to extend their jurisdiction to the full extent
permitted by federal interpretation of the due process clause.
It is a statutory requirement for jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in
California that the corporation be doing business in the state.9 What constitutes
doing business is not rigidly defined, but is held to be determined by the interpre-
tation given to the term by the federal courts.10 Thus, each federal case expanding
3 CAL. INs. CoDE § 1610.
4 CAL. INs. CoDE § 1612.
5 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 288 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1956).
6 355 U.S. at 223.
7 326 U.S. 310 (1945).8 id. at 316.
9 CAL. CODe Civ. PRoc. § 411; Kneeland v. Ethicon Suture Lab., Inc., 118 Cal. App. 2d 211,
212 (n.2), 257 P.2d 727, 728 (1953).See also Eclipse Fuel Eng'r Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Cal.
App. 2d 736, 307 P.2d 739 (1957).
10 See note 8 supra. See also LeVeck v. Griesedieck W. Brewery Co., 233 F.2d 772 (1956);
Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 122 Cal. App. 2d 376, 265 P.2d 130 (1953).
NOTES
the concept of doing business is automatically accepted as the California definition.
Applying the "fair play" rule of the International Shoe case as the most
recent federal interpretation of doing business, the California District Court of
Appeal said:"
The essence of doing business is that the corporation is present within the state suf-
ficiently to constitute it just and equitable that it be amenable to process within the
state ....
It is evident that this rule, like the "fair play" rule on which it is based, does
not provide a really concrete test for jurisdiction. It creates but does not answer
the question of what is precisely necessary to make a corporation "sufficiently
present." The California courts, however, have developed fundamental tests to
aid in answering this question.
Two requirements consistently demanded are that the corporation have some
personal representation within the state' 2 and that the activities carried on
through these representatives must be substantial and continuous.1
3
The first requirement is probably best expressed in the case of West Pub-
lishing Co. v. Superior Court where the court says: 14
[To be doing business, the corporation's] . . . business must be of such nature and
character as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the
local jurisdiction and is by its duly authorized officers or agents present .... (Emphasis
added.)
The application of this rule is well illustrated in Fielding v. Superior Court.1
The defendant corporation manufactured pharmaceuticals and operated locally
through an independent California distributor under a contract which provided
that the corporation would retain title until the goods were sold, set prices and
pay advertising costs. The fact that the corporation's representative in California
was an independent contractor and not an agent was held to be immaterial.
The presence of the corporation was the essential factor, whether this presence
was provided through the activities of an independent contractor, agents or
employees. 16
The requirement that the activities be continuous is clearly expressed in
Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co.'7 The Austin company retained the
11 Fielding v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 2d 490, 494, 244 P.2d 968, 970 (1952), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1953). See also McClanahan v. Trans-America Ins. Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d
171, 307 P.2d 1023 (1957); Iowa Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 2d 503, 246 P.2d
681 (1952).
12Perkins v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 94 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Estwing Mfg.
Co. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 2d 259, 275 P.2d 146 (1954) ; Smith and Wesson, Inc. v.
Municipal Court, 136 Cal. App. 2d 673, 289 P.2d 26 (1955); Martin Brothers EIec. Co. v.
Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 2d 790, 264 P.2d 183 (1953); Milbank v. Standard Motor
Constr. Co., 132 Cal. App. 67, 22 P.2d 271 (1933).
13 Duraladd Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 2d 226, 285 P.2d 699 (1955);
Proctor and Schwarz, Inc. v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 2d 376, 221 P.2d 972 (1950) ; Oro
Nay. Co. v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 2d 884, 187 P.2d 444 (1947). But see McClanahan
v. Trans-America Ins. Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 171, 307 P.2d 1023 (1957) ; Eclipse Fuel Eng'r.
Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 736, 307 P.2d 739 (1957).
3420 Cal. 2d 720, 728, 128 P.2d 777, 781 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1943).
15 i11 Cal. App. 2d 490, 244 P.2d 968 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952).
16 See also Gray v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 2d 55, 317 P.2d 114 (1957);
Thew Shovel Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 2d 183, 95 P.2d 149 (1939).
17 122 Cal. App. 2d 376, 265 P.2d 130 (1953).
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services of an independent commission salesman who systematically solicited
orders for their trailer parts. His acts were deemed a doing of business by
Austin, since the requirements of due process were met if the corporation
maintained substantial contacts with the state' 8
... through a course of regularly established and systematic business activity, distin-
guished from casual, isolated, or insubstantial contacts or transactions ....
Although these two decisions establish the two fundamental requirements for
a finding that a corporation is doing business in this state, they also leave two
distinct questions-(1) Is the person within the state (whether agent, employee
or independent contractor) acting as the personal representative of the cor-
poration? (2) If so, are his activities sufficient to make jurisdiction over the
corporation fair and equitable?
The case of Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. Superior Court19 provides the test which
is used to answer both of these questions. The only California contact of the
corporation, which manufactures beauty products, was the outright sale of the
products to independent jobbers. The jobbers, however, made contracts with
beauty shops, licensing use of the corporation's products in return for a small
fee and an agreement to honor the corporation's minimum prices and to refrain
from using competing products. The court found the corporation to be doing
business in California, basing this conclusion on the proposition that:20
If the representation which petitioner maintained in the state gave it in a practical
sense, and to a substantial degree, the benefits it would have enjoyed by operating
through its own office or paid sales force, it was clearly doing business in the state
so as to be amenable to civil process.
Both the fact of representation in the state and the sufficiency of the representa-
tive's activities were found to depend on the receipt of a benefit by the corporation
from such activities.
The rule that emerges from the California decisions is that for jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation the corporation must be present through the continuous
activities of some representative within the state and receive a benefit from such
activities.
In the McGee case, we find the requirements of due process satisfied if the
suit is "based on a contract which had substantial connection with (the) state."
The obvious conclusion is that due process, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, does not demand as essential for jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations either continuous activities or a personal representative within the
state. Neither, of course, was present in the McGee case.
What effect should we expect this federal interpretation of due process to
have on jurisdiction in California? The McGee case would seem to remove two
of the requirements thought necessary until now for finding a foreign corporation
is doing business in California, and thus subject to jurisdiction. An obstacle to
18 Id. at 388, 244 P.2d at 137.
19 96 Cal.App. 2d 134, 214 P.2d 541 (1950).
20 Id. at 136, 214 P.2d at 542. See also Eclipse Fuel Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d
736, 307 P.2d 739 (1957); Duraladd Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 134 Cal.App.2d 226,
285 P.2d 699 (1955); Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 122 Cal.App. 2d 376, 265 P.2d 130
(1953) ; Iowa Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 2d 503, 246 P.2d 681 (1952) ; Thew
Shovel Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 2d 183, 95 P.2d 149 (1939).
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this result is found in California Corporation Code where the phrase "transact
intrastate business" is defined as:21
.... [E]ntering into repeated and successive transactions of its business in this State,
other than interstate or foreign commerce.
This section is followed by sections 6400 to 6410 relating to "Qualification for
Transaction of Intrastate Business" by a foreign corporation. It would seem
reasonable that the effect of this definition could be limited to determining
when a foreign corporation is doing sufficient business in California to subject
it to state regulation and not to set binding requirements as to the amount of
business necessary to render the corporation amenable to jurisdiction. This
conclusion would seem to find support in the Jeter v. Austin Trailer case, where
the court says: 22
A less strict meaning may be attributed to the phrase "doing business" where the
question relates simply to whether a state court has jurisdiction than where taxation
or regulatory statutes are involved.
In the McGee case, the fact that it was a suit based upon a contract which
had substantial connection with the state was sufficient to displace the heretofore
required "presence" and "continuous activity." What else will be sufficient to
displace these two requirements must be decided in future litigation. However,
an acceptance of the jurisdictional expansion authorized by the McGee case
would in no way destroy the validity of the California "benefit" test. Rather,
it would be given added importance since its application would not be hampered
by requiring that the advantage or benefit result from continuous activities
carried on by a representative within the state.23 Until some more concrete rule is
announced by the federal courts, the ultimate test for California jurisdiction would
continue to be the receipt of a benefit. The McGee case does not supply any
absolute rule. If the benefit the corporation derives from its transactions with the
state is sufficiently great to make it appear fair and equitable to require the
corporation to defend here, formal requirements of "presence" through natural
persons and of continuous activities should not be necessary. 24
Julian Hultgren
21 CA.. CORP. CODE § 6203.
22 122 Cal. App. 2d 376, 381, 265 P.2d 130, 133 (1953).
2 See Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958);
Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d ......... 325 P.2d 21 (1958).
24 Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958), where the court says: "The applica-
tion of that rule [jurisdiction based on contact with forum state] will vary with the quality
and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws." See also Borgward v.
Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d ......... 325 P.2d 137 (1958).
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